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How Propaganda Became Public Relations pulls back the curtain on 
propaganda: how it was born, how it works, and how it has masked 
the bulk of its operations by rebranding itself as public relations. Cory 
Wimberly uses archival materials and wide variety of sources—Foucault’s 
work on governmentality, political economy, liberalism, mass psychology, 
and history—to mount a genealogical challenge to two commonplaces 
about propaganda. First, modern propaganda did not originate in the 
state and was never primarily located in the state; instead, it began and 
flourished as a for-profit service for businesses. Further, propaganda is 
not focused on public beliefs and does not operate mainly through lies 
and deceit; propaganda is an apparatus of government that aims to create 
the publics that will freely undertake the conduct its clients’ desire.
Businesses have used propaganda since the early twentieth century to 
construct the laboring, consuming, and voting publics that they needed 
to secure and grow their operations. Over that time, corporations have 
become the most numerous and well-funded apparatuses of government 
in the West, operating privately and without democratic accountability. 
Wimberly explains why liberal strategies of resistance have failed and 
a new focus on creating mass subjectivity through democratic means is 
essential to countering propaganda.
This book offers a sophisticated analysis that will be of interest 
to scholars and advanced students working in social and political 
philosophy, Continental philosophy, political communication, the history 
of capitalism, and the history of public relations.
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Everybody knows enough about propaganda to dislike it, but few know 
enough to say what it is that propaganda actually does. Propaganda typi-
cally conjures visions of flag-waving foreign nations where the govern-
ment has the people so discombobulated that they think that up is down 
and down is up. Or, closer to home, people use the word ‘propaganda’ to 
draw a tremendous circle that encompasses all fallacious attempts at per-
suasion and sometimes even uncharitably shades into meaning something 
like ‘ideas I disagree with.’ Propaganda in popular usage is an almost use-
lessly broad term vaguely tied to mass deception and public manipulation. 
Few know that propaganda is something much more specific than this—
with a well-defined and erudite body of professional knowledge, charac-
teristic practices, and even conferences for refining their techniques—and 
it is one of the propagandists’ great successes that few care to know it.
Propagandists abandoned the name ‘propaganda’ in the early twenti-
eth century to shed its negative connotations, and even many working in 
the field today cannot connect the contemporary name of the field with 
its historical one. ‘Propaganda’ first came into usage in 1622 from the 
Catholic Sacred Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith (Sacra 
Congregation de Propaganda Fide), but by the twentieth century its 
name was already popularly soiled. At the turn of the twentieth century, 
propagandists entered into a long search for a new name and it took 
decades for another name to reach consensus. Raymond Mayer lamented 
the souring of the term in his 1933 How to Do Publicity: “Through the 
years propaganda has been used to help win wars and to aid in struggles 
for trade. It has fallen into ill repute, probably more so than it deserves.”1 
Ivy L. Lee, perhaps the most influential of the modern propagandists, 
wrote about his frustration in trying to replace the word ‘propaganda’ 
with something else in 1925: “[Propaganda] is a bad word; I wish I had 
some substitute for it, but after all it means the effort to propagate ideas, 
and I do not know any real derivative to substitute for the word.”2 One 
can find plenty of other examples of prominent propagandists (e.g., Qui-
ett and Casey, Arthur Page, John Price Jones, and Wilder and Buell) 
lamenting the bad publicity propaganda had gotten and pondering the 
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2 Introduction
possibilities for a new name.3 ‘Publicity’ was the early favorite, but it was 
‘public relations’ that eventually gained dominance during the 1920s. 
Edward Bernays, perhaps the only other name in early twentieth- century 
propaganda to equal the prominence of Ivy Lee, took sole credit for 
renaming the field in his 1923 Crystallizing Public Opinion, and while he 
may have given himself too much credit (Bernays frequently did), he was 
certainly instrumental in the renaming:
When I came back to the United States [from World War I], I decided 
that if you could use propaganda for war, you could certainly use it 
for peace. And “propaganda” got to be a bad word because of the 
Germans using it, so what I did was to try and find some other words 
so we found the words “public relations.”4
The propagandists did their job well, and few people today know of 
the connection between public relations and propaganda; many ‘pub-
lic relations counsels’ do not even know the history of their own field. 
Propaganda popularly remains defined as any attempt at mass manipula-
tion, but the reality is that it is a multibillion-dollar industry with a well-
defined set of practitioners, knowledges, and economic relationships.5
In this text I will switch between ‘public relations’ and ‘propaganda’ 
as interchangeable terms. Propaganda is not different from public rela-
tions except in its name: public relations and propaganda name the same 
activities, the same rationalization of those activities, and even the same 
personages. They are the same except that public relations is a kind of 
doubling of propaganda, in that the term ‘public relations’ is propaganda 
for propaganda. I use the terms interchangeably in order to highlight 
their connection and to reconnect them more tightly in academic and 
public discourse. I understand that this usage might be counterintuitive 
to some, but it is precisely to the degree it is counterintuitive that it is nec-
essary to connect them. We are subject to a near constant barrage of cor-
porate public relations and we should know it for what it is: propaganda.
What is it exactly that propagandists do? How do they conceptualize 
society, the public, their clients, and their relationships to them? Any 
research into these questions inevitably runs into thorny empirical block-
ages. Namely, no public relations firm is willing to open the archives 
of their current or even remotely recent clients to preserve trade secrets 
and to forestall the tremendously bad publicity that would result from 
their activities becoming public. As the current work is not available, 
this text turns to the historical archives, a strategy that is unique among 
the current philosophical scholarship on propaganda; earlier work did 
not even have the opportunity to use the archives, as many have 70- to 
100-year waiting periods before they can be accessed. It is only in the last 
years that some of archives have become available. An overview of my 
approach and its unique results in comparison to past work is offered 
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toward the end of this introduction. Here, I would like to anticipate some 
of my findings and show their relation to the core thesis of this book.
Earlier materials, from 1900 to 1934, have several advantages. First, 
they are almost completely available to the public—a benefit that cannot 
be overstated. Just as importantly, the quality of the archives is excellent, 
not just for their breadth but also because of the quality of the materials 
themselves. The early twentieth century was a decisive time in the history 
of propaganda and the West more generally: a break had occurred with 
the previous propaganda methods of the nineteenth century, and a new 
kind of propaganda was being born a tumultuous birth. The crisis and 
rethinking of the field that occurred during the early part of the twentieth 
century produced an exceptionally articulate and philosophical discourse 
as these individuals created their field and created new prescriptions “for 
American institutions and especially for business.”6
The present-day consensus is that the first modern propaganda firm 
was the Publicity Bureau of Boston, founded in 1900.7 Such claims of 
origin must in the final analysis be somewhat arbitrary, as the Publicity 
Bureau was clearly influenced by developments before it and later prac-
titioners further enhanced, modified, and rejected the relations of power 
and knowledge that trace from the Publicity Bureau. Across this zone of 
temporal and conceptual flux, this work primarily casts its net from 1900 
and the founding of the Publicity Bureau to 1934, which not only marks 
the death of Ivy L. Lee—the foremost early counsel in public relations—
but also the point at which the Great Depression was understood to be 
an enduring phenomenon and thinking began to be concentrated around 
issues arising specifically from the Depression and Roosevelt’s New Deal. 
Within this early period, 1900–1934, there was a decentralized but none-
theless highly interconnected construction of modern propaganda. The 
eventuation of public relations was tied to the similarly dispersed and 
contested birth of the corporation and the modern urban consumptive 
public at sites across the United States. Propaganda stood between its cli-
ents (usually corporations) and their publics and sought to refigure their 
relationships to each other so that corporations could succeed: “Business 
publicity comprehends the entirety of the relations between any enter-
prise, corporation or individual, engaged in a commercial undertaking, 
and their or his public.”8 This is in part what makes this topic so inter-
esting: public relations explicitly and relentlessly sought to theorize and 
modify the relationships forming between the corporation and its pub-
lics, and there are few areas of greater importance to the present than the 
corporations or the public.
The first law to make incorporation easy in the United States was 
established in 1896 in New Jersey, and other states soon followed. From 
1896 forward, the corporate apparatus played an important role in pro-
ducing, shaping, and intensifying changes underway in the United States. 
The new urban populations, called to the cities by rapid changes in 
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American life, were characterized as a corporation’s ‘publics’ by propa-
gandists. These publics had many competing forms of description and 
many possible futures outside of their construction as corporate publics: 
these urban massifications were the proletariat to Marxists and Social-
ists, a series of rational autonomous individuals to laissez-faire liberals, 
laborers to factory owners, voters to politicians, dangerous classes to the 
middle and upper classes, and consumers to merchants. Alongside these 
competing and in some ways overlapping characterizations of the urban 
mass, propaganda developed a conception of the mass that would make 
it governable and that would render its conduct able to be conducted by 
its mostly corporate clientele.
The central chapters of this book conduct a deep investigation of 
the publics as a peculiar invention of a time and place and position the 
invention of the publics as part of the creation of the larger networks of 
power and knowledge that would define corporations in the twentieth 
and twenty-first centuries. It was not only corporations that were try-
ing to theorize and govern the urban masses; many other actors were 
engaged in similar projects, albeit guided by different values. Evidently, 
it was hard to avoid thinking about the urban masses at the turn of the 
century when it had manifested its new size and importance through the 
largest mass events that had yet taken place in human history. The May 
Day rallies that took place across the United States and Europe beginning 
in 1890 were both the largest collective demonstrations (totaling all the 
demonstrators across all locations) and the largest single demonstrations 
(the most people in a single location) that had ever taken place.9 These 
tremendous gatherings of individuals, by their own size and power, called 
out their unprecedented character, which public relations (PR) alongside 
others sought to shape, harness, and tame. These new urban masses were 
not just visible on May 4th, but in tenements, on factory floors, on strike, 
at the ballot box, at sporting events, consuming at the new department 
stores, and as the audience for the exploding mass media outlets. The 
urban mass in many ways culminated in the mass readership of newspa-
pers, a daily ritual shared by 15 million people in the United States at the 
turn of the century.
Propagandists intentionally placed themselves at the nexus of the cor-
poration, the mass media, the state, and the urban masses. This makes 
propaganda a sensitive, multifaceted, and well-situated barometer for the 
tensions that marked turn-of-the-century life, much like a seismograph 
placed between colliding tectonic plates. William Baldwin, one of the 
first and most respected early public relations counsels, wrote: “Rub-
bing takes place at all levels—person-to-person, group-to-group, nation-
to-nation, alliance-to-alliance. It can become highly abrasive where 
imbalances develop in management-labor, producer-consumer, landlord-
tenant, majority-minority relationships and the like.”10 It was the task of 
public relations not just to observe the rubbing of those plates but also to 
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adjust those plates, making sure that corporations and their publics took 
the forms that would best ease corporate growth and dominance.
It is no wonder then that propaganda was a site of great innovation 
and action: its constitution depended not just on its relationships to its 
publics and corporations, both of which were themselves intense poles 
of activity and change, but also to the contesting efforts of others within 
the United States to define them differently. Propagandists inserted their 
work into the relationship of businesses and the masses in order to shape 
corporations and the publics on terms favorable to its business clients, 
while simultaneously justifying and naturalizing the domination of busi-
ness in shaping American life:
Business is in the saddle. It is the power behind the throne. The world 
will be what business makes it, and advertising, if it sees its opportu-
nity in the largest light, can help business to formulate its ideals, put 
them into effective language, and write them not merely on the pages 
of newspapers and magazines or on the waves of the ether, but in the 
more enduring stuff of minds and hearts.11
Into the deeply and rapidly changing waters of the turn of the early twen-
tieth century public relations began to lay down piers, attempting to 
build and hold in place constructions of the public and corporations that 
were favorable to its clientele and to itself: “Publicity in its ultimate sense 
means the actual relationship of a company to the people, and that rela-
tionship involves far more than saying—it involves doing.”12 Propaganda 
sought to build the publics and corporations that would best achieve 
its corporate client’s directives, which sometimes placed propagandists 
in the odd position of working for the client against the client’s wishes 
when they judged that the client was doing something damaging to its 
own aims.
What sets this work apart in considering propaganda is how it exam-
ines the changes propaganda created in constructing its publics, corpora-
tions, and itself. Typically, as I will explore in greater detail and specificity 
in Chapter 5, previous studies of propaganda have assumed that propa-
ganda has neither significantly altered the nature of the publics nor busi-
ness (i.e., capitalism). Rather, previous critics have seen propaganda as a 
means to spread fallacious reasoning or provide an ideological cover—a 
kind of masking that hides the nature of things without fundamentally 
altering them. Previous efforts, popular and scholarly, have taken propa-
ganda to focus on beliefs. This work, instead of looking at propaganda 
as papering over reality with false belief, looks at propaganda as having 
an important role in creating it. Instead of taking propaganda, corpora-
tions, and the public as objects of study whose form is pre-given but 
hidden by propaganda, this study looks at propaganda as occupying a 
privileged place in the invention of corporations, their publics, and the 
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relations of government between the two. This work starts from a dif-
ferent set of methodological presuppositions than those that guide most 
work on propaganda. I will not shelter the hope most critics have that 
the world they want lives just below the surface, waiting to spring forth 
once the right critical philosophical incantation is uttered to clear away 
the lies and ideological distortions. This work begins from the position, 
well supported by the archives, that propaganda was an apparatus for 
transforming all the relationships its clients had with the world and in 
turn transforming those clients and the publics they governed. Edward 
Bernays was clear that his primary strategy was not lying or ideological 
masking of subjects’ true nature; he counseled his clients that “to make 
customers is the new problem.”13 Make, not deceive, were his words and 
conduct, not beliefs, was his target.
At the turn of the twentieth century, massive numbers of consumers, 
laborers, urban dwellers, and voting blocs that hardly existed 50 years 
before needed to be created on a gigantic scale. Relations and subjec-
tivities that may today seem common and even natural hardly existed as 
modern propaganda first went to work. Theodore Vail, head of AT&T 
and an early proponent for the wide-scale and continuous use of propa-
ganda by businesses, wrote in November, 1917:
Contrast the conditions which I saw as a boy and the conditions of 
today. When I first entered business, man was self-dependent; with 
the exception of the luxuries—and there were few enough of those—
the individual and his family produced every necessity of life. Most 
production and manufacture was by individual, manual labor. . . . 
Now none of us is self-contained; we depend upon others for not 
only the luxuries but also for the comforts and the very necessities 
of life.14
As corporations made steel I-beams, party dresses, and bar soap, they 
also needed to mass-produce the workers, voters, shoppers, and labor 
to fuel a stable and thriving environment for business in the twenty-first 
century. Propaganda did this by transforming corporations into appara-
tuses of government and subjectification.
One of the most powerful and provocative ways propaganda devel-
oped for thinking of itself was as an apparatus of government that 
worked in the last analysis through subjectification. Although the exact 
term ‘subjectification’ was not used as part of the early discourse of prop-
aganda, the idea of mass-producing publics to fill the human needs in a 
rising industrial and corporate order—as laborers, consumers, managers, 
 voters—was an exciting and innovative concept. Bernays wrote in 1928:
Mass production is only profitable if its rhythm can be maintained—
that is, if it can continue to sell its product in steady or increasing 
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quantity. The result is that while, under the handicraft or small-unit 
system of production that was typical a century ago, demand cre-
ated the supply, today supply must actively seek to create its corre-
sponding demand. A single factory, potentially capable of supplying 
a whole continent with its particular product cannot afford to wait 
until the public asks for its product; it must maintain constant touch, 
through advertising and propaganda, with the vast public in order 
to assure itself the continuous demand which alone will make its 
costly plant profitable. This entails a vastly more complex system of 
distribution than formerly. To make customers is the new problem.15
For most public relations counsels, subjectification was an activity that 
could only be carried so far. Propagandists worked with a view of the 
subject as composed of certain innate natural drives. These drives could 
be satisfied in a variety of ways, so the work of propagandists was to 
transform how drives were translated into specific desires and how sub-
jects went about satisfying those desires. For instance, Brewster and 
Palmer argued that all people have a drive for sociality and companion-
ship. This drive, while an inalterable fact, still could be satisfied in an 
almost infinite number of ways, and it was the job of the propagandist 
to train the customer to satisfy the drive in a way useful to their clients 
through “repetition, impressive size, illustration and short phrases”:
We do not know just what electricity is, but we do know something 
about how it acts and, within certain limitations, how it can be con-
trolled. Neither do we know just what the mind is, but through the 
researches of psychologists and through practical experience we 
have learned something of how the mind behaves and how, to some 
extent, its action can be influenced by advertising.16
Thus, by way of anticipation, we can glimpse here the notion that the 
government of the subject occurred largely through subjectification but 
that this subjectification was bounded: PR counsels assumed that the 
object of desire and the satisfaction of desire could be transformed but 
not the basic drives humans possess.
I differ from public relations in that I am not going to take the presup-
position that the basal psychology of the subject is essentially fixed in 
the way that public relations agents take it to be. I follow Foucault in 
thinking that it is an error to regard the subject “as a sort of elementary 
nucleus, a primitive atom or some multiple inert matter to which power 
is applied, or which is struck by a power that subordinates or destroys 
individuals.”17 Rather than accepting propagandists’ metaphysical claims 
to have discovered the essence of the subject, I treat that metaphysics as 
a cover and legitimation for the deeper creation of the subject who bore 
those supposedly innate drives.
8 Introduction
Nietzsche, Foucault, and many others have worked historically and 
especially through the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries to pro-
vide interesting genealogies of the emergence and eventual disappearance 
of subjectivities; the thrust of these works is to show that what we assume 
to be common to people across time and culture is not. For instance, 
feminists like Judith Butler, Diana Taylor, and Jana Sawicki disrupt an 
enduring understanding of gender roles; queer theorists like Mark Hal-
perin do the same with sexuality; Ladelle McWhorter and Cornel West 
do the same with race, Nietzsche with morality; and Foucault with mad-
ness, illness, health, and normality. These works empower and provide 
positive support for the analytical position I am taking here because they 
provide strong reason to be skeptical about claims to have discovered 
the nature of the subject. This work will take the more skeptical position 
that propagandists did not discover the nature of the subject but created 
a knowledge of the subject based on their own local needs. In this genea-
logical frame, I take it not only that the propagandists work through 
subjectification at a ‘surface’ level, altering the objects of desire and their 
manner of pursuit in the publics, but also that their understanding of the 
underlying nature of public subjectivity was also their creation and part 
of what they produced in their action.
This work takes its primary analytical point of departure on the sub-
ject from Foucault’s “The Subject and Power,” although it draws on com-
plementary materials from The History of Sexuality and several of his 
lecture courses from the late 1970s. In Foucault’s work from The History 
of Sexuality Volume I (1976) to “The Subject and Power” (1982), gene-
alogy does not posit a “theory of the subject,” so most accurately one 
would have to say that there is no such thing as ‘the genealogical subject’; 
this makes sense in my own aim to work outside of the priority of a sub-
ject that is marked by an enduring human essence. Instead of a theory 
of the subject that elaborates a human nature, Foucault’s genealogy per-
forms an “analysis” of subjectivity in order to write its “history.”18 An 
analysis differs from a theory in that a theory seeks to give a totalizing 
account—it seeks to capture the quiddity of the thing, in this case the 
subject. In contradistinction, an analysis of the subject aims to record 
the conditions under which it is emergent: “My objective, instead, has 
been to create a history of the different modes by which, in our culture, 
human beings are made subjects.”19 Instead of looking for the subject 
as an autonomous, independently existing object with its own essential 
definition and functions, this work approaches the subject as a part of a 
particular situation that only materializes through the differential elabo-
ration of relations of power in a localized context.
The subject, for Foucault and in this work, is something that only 
appears within a certain strategic situation; it has no being or meaning 
outside of it. For instance, there is no familial subject outside of famil-
ial relations (sons, daughters, mothers, fathers); there are only fathers 
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if there are mothers, and mothers if there are sons and daughters, and 
so forth. All subjects are found embedded in some particular situation 
and they gain their meaning (e.g., ‘corporate executive’) only within that 
specific arrangement of forces, in this case the arrangement known as the 
‘corporation.’ The subject here is not a generic element of theory that can 
be anonymously transposed between contexts but a localized phenom-
enon that is only revealed through a situated analysis of power relations.
Power is thus an important term in understanding the subjectivities 
produced in propaganda. In rehashing the subject of power in Foucault, 
I am mindful of the possibility of needless repetition. If sometimes people 
write that gallons of ink have been spilled on a topic, we would have to 
say that the amount of ink that has been spilled on Foucault’s theory of 
power is closer to what spilled from the Exxon Valdez. Resultantly, in 
establishing the analytical framework of this text, I will move quickly to 
narrow the discussion of power in Foucault to conduct, which is the most 
relevant aspect to understanding to the approach of this text.
Foucault explored several ways of understanding power throughout 
his career. During the 1970s, until Security, Territory, Population (1977), 
Foucault studied power through the lens of war. Especially in Society 
Must Be Defended, he looked at power as an expression of war; power 
was the assertion of one agent’s prerogative over another: “Power is 
war, the continuation of war by other means.”20 For reasons that are not 
directly germane to this text, Foucault found this notion of power prob-
lematic and began to explore power as conduct.
In “The Subject and Power,” Foucault asserts that the “equivocal 
nature of the term ‘conduct’ is one of the best aids for coming to terms 
with the specificity of power relations.”21 What is this equivocal nature, 
and why did Foucault feel that it would give great insight into power 
relations, and hence the creation of subjects? Conduct has two senses 
here for Foucault, senses that will also be important in this text. Conduct 
first refers to an individual’s own behavior in “an open field of possi-
bilities”; conduct indicates the free constitution of comportment among 
many available lines of comportment. Conduct in this first sense refers 
to the way that a subject directs its actions in a situation in which it has 
several possibilities.
Conduct also has the second sense of guiding or leading others, in the 
sense that a train conductor conducts a train or a symphony is conducted 
by a conductor. Foucault states that he is thinking of conduct in this sec-
ond sense less as “a confrontation between two adversaries” and more 
as the direction of the “possibilities or action of other people.”22 If previ-
ously Foucault had thought of power as war, as a struggle between con-
flicting partners, then with the notion of conduct he opened the door to 
the idea that power could be mutually acceptable and cooperative, if not 
always egalitarian. We should not make the mistake, however, of think-
ing that conducting others is necessarily cooperative or beneficent, just 
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that it is potentially so; conduct frees us from thinking that power must 
be conflict, struggle, and war, not that it will never be so. It is also pos-
sible to conduct others surreptitiously, against their interests, or aggres-
sively against their will—in the way a prison warden conducts the lives 
of prisoners.
Conduct in this second sense of the conduct of others is deeply tied to 
the idea of government in Foucault. For Foucault, the sense of govern-
ment that emerges in the renaissance is an attempt to direct the  conduct—
or to conduct the conduct—of subjects into specific paths:
Before it acquires its specifically political meaning in the sixteenth 
century, we can see that “to govern,” covers a very wide semantic 
domain in which it refers to movement in space, material substance, 
diet, the care given to an individual and the health one can assure 
him, and also to the exercise of command, of a constant, zealous, 
active, and always benevolent prescriptive activity. It refers to the 
control one may exercise over oneself and others, over someone’s 
body, soul, and behavior.23
Foucault studies government as a historically specific set of power, 
knowledge, and subject relations that develop in the West as a means to 
conduct the conduct of others. As we will see later in the text, propagan-
dists offer a critique of the dominant modes of government in the West, 
especially liberalism, and holds propaganda to be a necessary corrective.
Freedom plays an important role in this thought on government, con-
duct, and subjectivity. The conduct of conduct makes sense as a descrip-
tion only if the subject being conducted is free. Stating that a subject 
is conducted implies that the subject could have conducted herself oth-
erwise but was directed through those possibilities by another. Like 
the train conductor moves the train between its many possible routes, 
and the symphony conductor conducts the symphony through just one 
arrangement of instruments, pitches, and rhythms among many, so too 
does subject’s conduct get guided among many possibilities. This does 
not mean that all the possibilities are equally weighted in terms of their 
costs and rewards (some may be more greatly rewarded than others, 
some are heavily penalized, etc.), but nonetheless conduct implies that 
the subject is working in a relational context in which multiple differ-
ent ways to constitute itself exist and that government is deployed to 
move the subject towards one of those possible lines. Conduct—whether 
self-conduct or the conduct of conduct by others—always occurs in a 
context of freedom, where freedom is the open possibility of constituting 
many possible lines of comportment. Propaganda, like other means of 
conducting the conduct of others (coaching, pastoring, parenting, etc.) is 
the reaction to the “intransigence of freedom” of the subject; government 
seeks to guide the subject’s conduct, knowing that the conduct could be 
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constituted in many possible ways, at least some of which the governor 
prefers to others.24 It is the threat of the subject acting outside of the 
interests of the governor that makes government necessary. Without the 
freedom to constitute comportment in many possible ways, it is unnec-
essary to govern them; likewise, it is the freedom of the subject and the 
possibility of unwanted conduct that prompts the growth of PR.
Precisely the problem that public relations and their corporate clients 
were faced with was the freedom of subjects to conduct themselves in 
ways contrary to the desires of corporations. The goal of corporate prop-
aganda was to alter the behavior of subjects and channel them into com-
posing their behavior in ways favorable to the new corporate order. It 
should not be forgotten that propaganda began in a time of great change 
for subjects in the United States as the myth and reality of the Jeffersonian 
citizen farmer was being displaced by the many faces of the urban wage 
earner. In the time of this explosion of new economic, social, and politi-
cal conduct at the turn of the twentieth century, corporations sought to 
govern the publics towards the conduct that would enhance their wealth, 
control, preeminence, and security. Propaganda is a response to free con-
duct and an attempt, not to dominate it via violence or physical con-
straint, but to conduct it in its freedom towards the desired outcomes. Do 
not mistake my point: it is not that violence and physical constraint were 
not used alongside propaganda—they were—but that propaganda is dis-
tinct from physical violence as a rationalization and practice of power. 
This Foucauldian analytics of the subject not only provides a way to take 
the subjectification of public relations seriously, but it also provides a lens 
through which the relations of power built through public relations can 
be understood; namely, as a particular manifestation of the conduct of 
conduct, government through mass subjectification.
That this genealogical framework of analysis is so different from the 
extant literature is outstanding on its face because many propagandists 
explicitly define their service as government through the transformation 
of the governed, “the significant revolution of modern times is not indus-
trial or economic or political but the revolution which is taking place 
in the art of creating consent among the governed.” And propagandists 
are not shy to say that they govern through transforming businesses 
and publics: “[The public relations counsel] helps to mold the action of 
his client as well as to mold public opinion.”25 To fail to consider how 
public relations changes its publics or its clients, either at the level of 
desire or in deeper ways, has left much of the literature blinkered to the 
effects of propaganda. To better spell this out, I would like to consider 
how this blinkering operates in three broad types of writing on pub-
lic relations: (1) analyses in the social sciences that seek to determine 
how public relations and propaganda work to influence and shape minds 
(diagnostic analyses); (2) archival work that seeks to explain the context 
into and from which public relations was born (historical analyses); and 
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(3) critical leftist work that that argues for the injustice and immorality 
of public relations (critical theory and social epistemology).
One can cluster together a whole series of works, generally from the 
social sciences, that aim to explain why propaganda works and when 
it works best. These articles and books often do not always explicitly 
state their own operating assumptions about the subject but presuppose 
it in their discussions of propaganda. Many of these studies make claims, 
again some only implicitly, that follow the formula, ‘Human nature is X, 
therefore effective propaganda can only take forms Y and Z,’ or its vari-
ant, ‘Human nature is X, therefore propaganda cannot effectively take 
forms A and B.’ For example, in Ellul’s canonical study of propaganda 
he repeatedly makes claims of the following form: “Besides, the public is 
only sensitive to contemporary events,” or:
One trait of vertical propaganda is that the propagandee remains 
alone even when he is part of a crowd. His shouts of enthusiasm or 
hatred, though part of the shouts of the crowd, do not put him in com-
munication with others; his shouts are only a response to the leader.26
Ellul assumes a stable and apparently universal form of subjectivity in 
order to make these types of claims in Propaganda: The Formation of 
Men’s Attitudes. He makes these kind of claims because he is interested 
in producing scientific knowledge of the human being and its relationship 
to propaganda, at least in the sense that he wants to produce knowl-
edge that does not vary with different populations, at different times, or 
in different circumstances. By assuming a like nature across all human 
beings, Ellul can proclaim the efficacy or inefficacy of different methods 
of propaganda across different national and historical contexts to pro-
duce universal psychological claims about how propaganda works.
Jowett, who is another important writer on propaganda and public 
relations, also makes similar claims. In his article, The Korean POW 
Controversy and the Origins of a Myth, he claims that brainwashing is 
impossible because the nature of the human psyche does not permit it: 
“Despite the assurances of psychologists, psychiatrists, and those who 
study the human brain, the notion of ‘brainwashing’ as a distinct pos-
sibility remains as firmly entrenched as ever.”27 Here, Jowett hoped to 
show why the subject of contemporary psychology could not be deeply 
affected by ‘brainwashing.’ He argues that the notion of brainwashing 
should be dropped as a serious matter of study and research because the 
psychological notion of the subject he adopts precludes it. Again, the 
implication is that the subject is something given, natural, and funda-
mentally inalterable, which allows for knowledge about propaganda to 
be produced that does not vary with changes in time, place, and culture.
Lasswell’s studies are older but are nonetheless still highly influential 
in the study of public relations and propaganda. Like Ellul and Jowett, 
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he makes universalizing assumptions about human nature in order to 
explain the efficacy of public relations and propaganda. Unlike Ellul and 
Jowett, he states explicitly that his assumptions about the nature of the 
subject derive from ‘common sense’ rather than dressing them up in the 
white lab coat of the sciences:
The procedure in this investigation has been to stick close to common- 
sense analysis. . . . The present student goes no further than to 
develop a simple classification of the various psychological materi-
als, which have been used to produce certain specified results, and to 
propose a general theory of strategy and tactics, for the manipulation 
of these materials.28
In order to produce a theory of the efficacy of propaganda across coun-
tries, Lasswell makes assumptions about the similarity of all publics in 
order to show how they must be affected by propaganda. Regardless of 
whether he works from the framework of psychology as Jowett does or 
from “common-sense” assumptions, he still needs to produce the subject 
as an enduring and universal substrate if his knowledge of propaganda 
is not to be a history but a science. If he wants to give an account about 
“how international war propaganda may be conducted with success” 
which applies broadly across times and cultures, then the subject and its 
nature must remain fixed so that conduct of propaganda in relation to 
the subject can also remain fixed.29
All these social scientific analyses essentially aim to create a scientific 
knowledge of propaganda, essentially parallel to the knowledge produced 
by propagandists themselves. In order to fill in the ‘missing’ discourse on 
human nature and unlock the true secrets of propaganda, these social 
scientists have had to proceed as if the propagandists were missing such 
an analysis so that they could produce it. Unfortunately for them, the 
propagandists had no such lack; they have an incredibly well-elaborated 
psychology of the human being. The cause of this problem is that many, 
many social scientific studies are strongly lacking in a solid knowledge of 
the propagandists’ own texts and archives and are too willing to share 
their inferred assumptions.
This assumption of a stable subject of propaganda unknowingly con-
tributes to the legitimation of the propagandists’ understanding of public 
subjectivity. In taking the nature of the subject to be fixed, as do Lass-
well and Ellul, they can have a hard time explaining how propaganda 
can be so effective without also having to support the propagandists’ 
claims to have discovered the nature of the subject. For instance, if prop-
aganda techniques work by assuming the public to be subrational and 
they establish techniques that work through treating the public as subra-
tional, there is a tremendous risk of reifying public relations’ assumption 
of the public as subrational in explaining the technique’s efficacy if one 
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takes the nature of the subject to be fixed. Propagandists formulated their 
relationships of government with the public based on a precisely articu-
lated theory of public subjectivity, which in turn shaped their practices of 
propaganda. When social scientists set out to ‘discover’ the fixed psychol-
ogy that makes propaganda work, they are vulnerable to restating and 
legitimating the nature of the subject as it is framed in the discourse of 
propaganda.
The textbook Effective Public Relations—perhaps the most widely 
read and influential textbook on PR since its first publication in 1952—
offers a clear example of this danger. On page 270 of the millennial 
8th edition, the textbook states that individuals come to opinions 
through ‘salience,’ defined as “feelings about an object derived from an 
individual’s experience,” and ‘pertinence,’ defined as “the relative value 
of an object on the basis of an object-by-object comparison.” In other 
words, subjects develop feelings about objects and they compare those 
feelings to other feelings to arrive at a related understanding of things. 
Do subjects reason? Do subjects have a principled analysis of the larger 
social situation on which to base their understanding of value? Do they 
have an ability to put aside feelings for a commitment to an abstract 
sense of virtue or morality in the formation of values? No, subjects have 
none of these abilities. Instead what we get in this picture of the human 
being is a mass of feelings whose weight is only determined only by com-
parison with other feelings. This is not a full-fledged rational individual 
but an emotionally driven being whose actions are determined solely 
by the strength of their feelings. This is pretty much the definition of 
someone who is stupid, according to Merriam-Webster: someone who 
is “not sensible or logical.”30 In building a universal notion of the sub-
ject out of a set of power relations designed to disempower and govern 
the publics, there is tremendous risk that the underlying assumptions of 
these  relationships—that the public is fickle, subrational, unconsciously 
driven, suggestible, and impulsive—also becomes the conclusion of the 
scientific researcher.
Ellul’s study of propaganda demonstrates the dangers of unknowingly 
replicating public relations’ presuppositions about the subject as scien-
tific fact. For instance, Ellul argues that the only real effect reason has 
on the public is aesthetic; people do not understand reason but relate to 
it as a kind of costume that inspires deference, like the medieval masses 
reacted to hearing the Bible read in Latin (e.g., with deference and awe 
but without understanding). Ellul writes that propaganda that tries to 
use “facts to demonstrate, rationally, the superiority of its system and 
to demand everybody’s support” only “eliminate[s] personal judgment 
and the capacity to form one’s own opinion.” In other words, facts para-
lyze the judgment of the average individual by catapulting the individual 
into a realm of thought that is beyond him: facts do “not enlighten the 
reader or the listener; they drown him.” The average individual “cannot 
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remember them all [facts], or coordinate them, or understand them.”31 
As a result, Ellul’s study—even though he is a social scientist studying 
propaganda and is not a propagandist—comes to the same conclusions 
about public subjectivity that the public relations practitioners like Lee, 
Bernays, Wilder and Buell come to: propaganda is an essential part of 
modern life because it transcribes the demands of the technical and 
rational basis of modern society into an irrational and emotional dis-
course that builds consent at the only level that the masses are able to 
receive it—the subrational.32
As the social scientific literature writings claim to be working from an 
objective view of human nature, they ultimately disavow their role in 
producing and normalizing the relations of subjectivity and control pro-
duced by propagandists. Rather than seeing propaganda and its publics 
as a development that occurred at a particular point in human history as 
the result of a confluence of historically unique forces, they produce a sci-
entific discourse that argues that propagandists discovered and exploited 
a truth about human nature that was always already there, even if undis-
covered. They give the view, at least implicitly, that propaganda is not the 
product and responsibility of any given society or set of relationships and 
it cannot be changed or eliminated; instead, they produce propaganda as 
something that we must live with because it preys upon weaknesses that 
subjects will always have as long as they remain human. In sum, many 
of the works in the social sciences that work diagnostically to produce a 
scientific knowledge of how propaganda works end up reproducing and 
giving legitimacy to the terrible knowledge of the subject and the govern-
mental relations of propagandists.
A second set of literature is not social scientific but historical. This lit-
erature documents the personages, institutions, and events in public rela-
tions more than it focuses on the mechanics of how propaganda works. 
It is often hard to tell exactly what the issues are that these histories are 
interested in because the texts frequently have no explicit methodology 
or thesis. Miller’s The Voice of Business: Hill & Knowlton and Post-
war Public Relations never raises the topic of methodology. Capozzola’s 
Uncle Sam Wants You: World War I and the Making of the Modern 
American Citizen is in many ways much more politically aware and artic-
ulate than Miller’s work but never raises the issue of its own method and 
perspective. Scott Cutlip’s The Unseen Power: A History is in many ways 
an unmatchable work. Cutlip was a friend to many of the top figures in 
public relations and he had unparalleled access, not only to the public 
relations counsels, but also to their family and friends. In his papers at 
the Wisconsin Historical Society, the widow of Hamilton Wright carried 
on a correspondence with him about her husband’s work even though it 
caused her such grief that she had a serious lapse in health.33 The will-
ingness to endure a crisis of health as the result of interviews and then 
persevere through future interviews serves as an example of the loyalty 
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and trust Cutlip engendered. Even so, this work has little reflection on 
its methodology beyond carefully documenting its sources and their use-
fulness. I can only assume that the topic of methodology or aims is not 
raised in these texts because they conceive of themselves as transparent 
conduits of the historical facts: there can be no room for methodology or 
aims if the work is an exact transcription of the past.
Cutlip’s work, while in many ways irreplaceable, nonetheless demon-
strates the problem of going without an explicit methodology and exami-
nation of one’s assumptions. In the first page of the Prologue of Unseen 
Power, we get as close as this text comes to a thesis and an explicit meth-
odology when Cutlip states, “I held, and still hold, that only through the 
expertise of public relations can causes, industries, individuals, and insti-
tutions make their voice heard in the public forum where thousands of 
shrill competing voices daily re-create the Tower of Babel.”34 Here Cutlip 
accepts tout court the public justifications of propagandists going back 
to the father of public relations, Ivy L. Lee.35 Cutlip accepts uncritically 
the propaganda about propaganda: namely that it is an aid to democracy 
because it makes previously unheard voices available—it makes democ-
racy more representative and fair. The biblical reference to the Tower of 
Babel in Cutlip shows what he thinks the state of things is—total chaos—
and astonishingly places PR in the role of God returning order.
My point here is that without an explicit thesis, methodology, and their 
critical review, one’s assumptions are all too likely to fall back on some-
thing like a ‘commonsense’ perspective on propaganda. The problem with 
relying on common sense in a study of propaganda is that propaganda 
has been working for more than a century to transform the common 
sense about itself. If public relations has been even partially successful in 
transforming the perception of propaganda and public relations, we need 
to be very careful and quite skeptical about ‘commonsense’ analyses of 
public relations.
This situation is made more dangerous by the fact that many peo-
ple writing history about propaganda are themselves often public rela-
tions counsels, once were counsels, or were trained in related disciplines 
like journalism, communications, or public relations (even if they never 
worked in PR). Cutlip again comes to mind, as does Miller, but also Lass-
well, L’Etang, Olasky, Center, Broom, Ries, Gower, Mickey, and Hiebert. 
Let me be clear: this does not mean that the foregoing authors have not 
produced good work or that they have never been critical. However, it 
does highlight that a large number of people working on the history of 
public relations are working out of public relations and the related dan-
ger of writing from ‘common sense.’ Authors who have been trained in 
public relations and have been taught to view it favorably are doubly at 
risk of adopting a ‘commonsense’ view of public relations that is blink-
ered. When common sense is the guide, the same problems that befall the 
social scientific literature arise. Insofar as propagandists’ views about the 
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subject, its governance, or the roles of corporations have become com-
mon sense, then the literature runs the risk of naturalizing those views by 
uncritically adopting them.
Of course, not all writing on public relations is sympathetic, uncrit-
ical, and unreflective about its methodology or its subject. There is a 
strong left-leaning tradition of criticism, which builds on the early work 
of progressives like Upton Sinclair and Ida Tarbell. More recently, Noam 
Chomsky has brought volumes of criticism from an anarchist perspec-
tive, and Marxian thinkers like Bourdieu, Habermas, Hall, Marcuse, 
Horkheimer, and Adorno have worked on propaganda and related 
issues. Stuart Ewen’s recent work PR!: A Social History of Spin is less 
radical than the preceding authors but is nonetheless situated from a crit-
ical perspective. Of the aforementioned thinkers, Chomsky, Habermas, 
Marcuse, and Ewen have most specifically written at length on the spe-
cific topic of public relations and propaganda. These authors also look at 
subjects as having a fixed and articulable nature but unlike many of the 
social scientists and historians, they do not take on the propagandists’ 
assumptions about the subject its necessary government but formulate 
their own counternarratives. This too is problematic for the way that it 
masks the changes in subjectivity brought by propagandists by assuming 
its nature is ultimately inviolable.
My aim here is not to address these thinkers’ body of thought as a 
whole, which is a task that would require its own volume, but instead 
just to deal with their methodology vis-à-vis propaganda. Chomsky, 
Habermas, and Marcuse all share an assumption about the universality 
of the subject with the social scientists discussed earlier, though to differ-
ent effect. In Chomsky’s famous debate with Foucault in 1971, he said:
That is, there are two intellectual tasks: one, and the one that I was 
discussing, is to try to create the vision of a future just society; that 
is to create, if you like, a humanistic social theory that is based, if 
possible, on some firm and humane concept of the human essence or 
human nature.36
At the time Marcuse wrote One-Dimensional Man, he had developed a 
notion of the human psyche based on a rewriting of Freud according to 
Marxist sensibilities. According to Marcuse, this psychology could be 
found in all human societies, though it was differently manifested accord-
ing to the specific repressions demanded by that society. As a consequence, 
Marcuse’s primary critique of propaganda in One-Dimensional Man was 
that the human psyche would be better suited to a different and lesser set of 
oppressions than it currently encounters in contemporary Western society:
As the liberty to work or to starve, [free enterprise] spelled toil, 
insecurity, and fear for the vast majority of the population. [. . .] If 
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the productive apparatus could be organized and directed towards 
the satisfaction of vital needs, its control might well be centralized; 
such control would not prevent individual autonomy, but render it 
possible.37
Habermas’s most relevant work on public relations is his 1962 habili-
tation, Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit (“Structural Transformation of 
the Public Sphere”). This early work of his is compelling and echoes some 
of the themes of my own work: public opinion as a technology of domi-
nation, public relations as a tool to manufacture consent, and advertising 
and public relations as technologies to manufacture the public sphere. 
Even given this overlap, our primary emphases differ: Habermas reads 
the rise of public relations and its ilk as a story about the rise and fall of 
reason. For Habermas, the enlightenment drive to democratization meant 
the growth of salons and coffeehouses in which rational-critical debate 
could thrive and place a check on economic and political forces. In time, 
structural and technological changes in society—importantly the rise of a 
cheap and prevalent for-profit mass media—undermined those spaces of 
reason and replaced them with gibberish in support of an economic and 
political elite. I would not deny that all of that is true in its outlines, but 
I think the emphasis on the story of reason is misplaced in his account. 
For Habermas, subjects have remained the same but their social context 
has shifted for the worse, drawing out irrational and atomized behavior.
In the end, for all the help and inspiration that Chomsky, Marcuse, and 
Habermas have given to my own work, my criticism of them is that they 
are too conservative. They are conservative in the sense that they aim to 
return to and enhance—thus conserve—what they see as essential human 
qualities. They all wish to return to something that has been lost: Chom-
sky wants to end the alienation of production, Marcuse wants to satisfy 
“true needs,” and Habermas wants to recover critical-rational subjectiv-
ity.38 These leftists seek to authorize the imposition and enforcement of 
a set of social relations premised on the flourishing of the subject’s own 
true nature; in other words, these discourses portray the subject’s own 
being as calling for the imposition of the particular social and politi-
cal circumstances that they favor and that only they adequately articu-
late. These authors attribute a voice to the nature of the subject that has 
the convenient effect of allowing them to disregard the subject’s own 
literal voice in favor of the phantasmal and essential one that appears in 
their manuscripts. Here Marcuse traps the public in a kind of catch-22 
when he states that the public must and can have the final say over their 
needs but can only have that say when they are “free” (in other words, 
when they agree with his understanding of what a human should want 
by nature): “In the last analysis, the question of what are true and false 
needs must be answered by the individuals themselves but only in the last 
analysis; that is, if and when they are free to give their own answer.”39 
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The voice of human nature is created in these works through the guise 
of social sciences and, although the works’ stated intention is to oppose 
oppression, they too silence these abject populations through assuming 
that only they, and not the subjects themselves, can speak their true wants 
and needs.
In one important way, the leftists are much less democratic and egali-
tarian than even the propagandists and public relations counsels: it is 
more common to see the public relations counsels question the ethics 
of proceeding to impose their social-political vision on the public than 
it is to see Chomsky, Marcuse, or Habermas engaging in such moments 
of self-doubt and questioning. It can be hard for do-gooders to see their 
image of the good as an alien imposition that is controlling, dominating, 
and excising of the autonomy of those they claim to speak for. Foucault 
criticizes Chomsky on similar grounds when he strives to get Chomsky to 
see that his proposals for proletarian revolution will not achieve an ideal 
justice but simply a different justice, a shift in power relations: “That is 
the justification, but one doesn’t speak in terms of justice but in terms 
of power.”40 What is amazing about the debate is Chomsky’s seeming 
inability to recognize the possibility of Foucault’s point. Chomsky never 
openly grapples with the question of whether or not the ideals that he 
constructs are really justified by an “essential nature” or are instead 
just the imposition of his own ideals, no matter how well-meaning. His 
assumptions about the justice and accuracy of his claims do not push him 
to consider what might be the consequences of his ideas if in fact they are 
not demanded by human nature but instead are his own invention.
I am concerned about the tyranny implicit in these works that results 
from the way they deploy human nature as an authorization for a politi-
cal regime. But in respect to propaganda, I am also worried that they 
fail to see some of the changes propaganda has wrought because they 
assumed that such changes are impossible. In other words, their prob-
lematic position can be stated thusly: since the nature of the subject is 
fixed in the ways that they describe in their texts, then there can be no 
worry of the nature of the subject being changed by propaganda; thus, it 
is unnecessary, in theory and in practice, to grapple with propagandists 
efforts to change the nature of the subject. This position is especially hard 
to maintain in reference to propaganda, not just because of their frequent 
discussions of transforming and shaping basic elements of human nature 
but also because the historical record is rife with tremendous changes 
in the public. It is astounding to see the transformation of small farm-
ers into laborers, consumers, and pro-corporate/pro-war voters in the 
United States in a relatively short period following the Civil War and into 
the new century. My own reaction verged on incredulity on finding out 
that in 1850, 95% of the goods the average American used were self-
manufactured and 5% purchased, but by 1950 the equation was more 
than reversed. It forces one not just to ask how human beings changed 
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over that period of time but also how they might yet change. What else 
might we have become other than consumers? More importantly, what 
might we be yet? In place of a discourse that is blinkered to the past 
changes wrought in human nature and how it might yet be changed, 
this work takes the constitution of the subjectivity of the publics to be a 
historical question that can only be answered in reference to the archives 
rather than a theory of the subject and whose future contains a multitude 
of possibilities and no single ideal answer. I write this work on the gene-
alogy of the publics to reveal its contingent formation and to open the 
possibilities offered by the future. In other words, this text is performa-
tively democratic insofar as it seeks to cast doubt on the naturalization of 
domination and make available different vectors of analysis and action 
on the creation of subjects and the relations of power and knowledge in 
which they are enmeshed today.
This democratic solution has to be differentiated from the one Stuart 
Ewen offers in his book PR!: A Social History of Spin, in that my aim 
is not to restore a situation that was once present but is now lost. In 
PR! Ewen essentially wants to walk democracy backwards, rolling back 
the inroads that corporate power and public relations have made into 
democratic life and returning to an ideal of Jeffersonian democracy.41 His 
book reads as the story of the erosion of the democracy that was, with 
the exception that the New Deal slowed this tide and even temporarily 
pressed democracy forward. Even though the New Deal made headway, 
it was not so much by producing a new form of democracy but by extend-
ing Jeffersonian principles: ‘“To ensure this flow [of communication]’ and 
to further his commitment to ‘Jeffersonian’ principles, Roosevelt would 
promote the federal government not merely as an instrument of ‘directive 
intelligence,’” but as a “clearing house for the exchange of information 
and ideas, of facts and ideals, affecting the general welfare.”42 For Ewen, 
FDR was the return of what was in the process of being lost. In the 
end, even the Jeffersonian New Deal was overwhelmed by the “Hamil-
tonians,” the corporate “engineers of consent.”43 In time, the New Deal 
became just another healthy piece of democracy eroded by corporate/PR 
influence that needs to be restored: “For this situation to change, the pub-
lic sphere—currently dominated by corporate interests and consciously 
managed by public relations professions—must revert to the people.”44
The aim of this text is not to reclaim the truth of the human essence 
so that an ideal political regime can be constructed or recovered. Its aim 
is to write a genealogy of propaganda so that we may better see just 
how contingent and fragile our present is. Propaganda has spent over 
a century at the hands of elites, mostly corporations, aiming to recon-
stitute mass subjectivity and public conduct through a new kind of pri-
vate government; this has been done so effectively that it may be hard 
to see at present just how much of public life is both pernicious and 
contingent. Hopefully, by mapping these contingent lines of force we 
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can better see their effects and also how they might be resisted. Previ-
ous literature on propaganda has many things to recommend it, and this 
work is indebted to it. Nonetheless, that critical literature is not able 
to see the depth, audacity, and import of the change propaganda was 
proposing because it wanted to hold out the endurance of the past so 
that it might be recovered in the present. In contrast, I aim to chart how 
propaganda has framed and sought to govern public subjectivity without 
making the assumption that the nature of the subject is fixed and mak-
ing the claim that either the propagandists have gotten it right or gotten 
it wrong. Instead, this text looks empirically and genealogically at how 
propaganda emerged within a specific context and how its relations of 
subjectivity, knowledge, and power were both produced and productive 
of its context. This genealogical approach has the advantage of not hav-
ing to stand against the evidence of the archives; it makes sense of the 
historically different articulations of power, knowledge, and subjectivity 
that occurred before propaganda and the twentieth century, the break 
that propaganda brought to those relations, and the eventual spread and 
even hegemony of the relations of power, knowledge, and subjectivity of 
propaganda.
In sum, this text is a genealogical analysis of the emergence of appa-
ratuses of propaganda through the archives. By ‘apparatus’ (dispositif ), 
I follow Foucault’s usage, which is to use the term to frame an analysis 
rather than to stipulate a definition. In other words, to look at something 
as an apparatus is to approach it as a number of parts whose contingent 
relationships with each other form the contingent being of the apparatus. 
Foucault studies the relations between the different parts of an apparatus 
as driven by an “urgent need” or problem that organizes his response:
What I’m trying to pick out with this term is, firstly, a thoroughly 
heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, archi-
tectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative meas-
ures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic 
 propositions—in short, the said as much as the unsaid. Such are the 
elements of the apparatus. The apparatus itself is the system of rela-
tions that can be established between these elements. Secondly, what 
I am trying to identify in this apparatus is precisely the nature of 
the connection that can exist between these heterogeneous elements. 
[. . .] Thirdly, I understand by the term “apparatus” a sort of—shall 
we say—formation which has as its major function at a given histori-
cal moment that of responding to an urgent need.45
To study propaganda as an apparatus means to search for the parts that 
compose it and to analyze their relationship as a response to an “urgent 
need.” One of the most interesting parts of propaganda is how, in respond-
ing to the needs of business, especially the needs of the new corporations, 
it sought to meet that need and transform it. The birth of propaganda 
is also the story of the birth of the modern corporation and its publics. 
Propaganda became a vector for the induction of government into the 
corporation and the transformation of its relationship to its publics.
Generally, my work should only be construed to be making a claim 
about the propagandists’ archives. Dealing with the wide variety of 
archival texts (for publication, to clients, for internal training, in private 
discussion with other PR counsels, etc.) offers more than enough for a 
single volume. If I were to take on further domains of analysis, it would 
almost certainly have to be in another volume besides this one. The kind 
of statistics that many would want to see accompany this analysis of 
 propaganda—for instance, statistical analysis about changes in consump-
tion habits—are neither available now nor will they ever be in the future. 
Why? The American Statistical Association was formed in 1839 in Bos-
ton, but zero professional statisticians were being trained in the United 
States until the 1870s. Even in 1870, there were still no master’s degrees 
and PhDs offered in the United States. It took a significant amount of 
time for enough advanced practitioners to be educated and then directed 
to the study of business for any useful statistical information to be pro-
duced. In the United States, business statistics were not widely collected 
until the Hoover administration of 1929–1933. After this move by the 
Hoover administration, there was an additional lag until the private 
sector began to make extensive use of the statistics and keep their own 
detailed statistical information.46 In sum, the data with which one could 
use to make fine-grained statistical analyses about the effects of propa-
ganda do not exist in the time frame I am examining. What remains 
outside of the possibility of these statistical analyses is exactly the kind of 
archival analysis that I am doing here.
In terms of resisting propaganda, successful displacements of propa-
ganda will have to take seriously that propaganda is not primarily an 
epistemological apparatus but one of government and subjectification. 
Resisting propaganda is not so much a task of liberation from various 
kinds of falsehood, as if underneath all the lies remained an untouched, 
happy, and flourishing being, waiting to be set free by the truth. Propa-
ganda has created contemporary subjects—the publics—to be willing 
and cooperative agents in producing corporate profit and hegemony. If 
we want the kind of subjects that will produce new and more demo-
cratic relations of power and knowledge, they will have to be created in 
response to the disposition of contemporary relations.
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